Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Globalized Competition Law Enforcement: Insights from JFTC Experiences by Takigawa Toshiaki & 滝川 敏明
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the
Globalized Competition Law Enforcement:
Insights from JFTC Experiences
著者 Takigawa Toshiaki
journal or
publication title
CPI Antitrust Chronicle
volume 1
page range 1-7
year 2014-06
権利 This article is permitted by Competition
Policy International, Inc.
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com
/
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10112/8843
 www.competitionpolicyinternational.com 
Competition Policy International, Inc. 2014© Copying, reprinting, or distributing this article is forbidden by anyone 
other than the publisher or author. 
  
 
 
CPI Antitrust Chronicle 
June 2014 (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Toshiaki Takigawa 
Kansai University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Globalized 
Competit ion Law Enforcement:  
Insights from JFTC Experiences 
 
CPI	  Antitrust	  Chronicle  June	  2014	  (1)	  
 
 2	  
Balancing Fairness and Eff iciency in the Globalized 
Competit ion Law Enforcement: Insights from JFTC 
Experiences 
 
Toshiaki Takigawa1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A competition agency’s decision, consisting of a remedy and a fine, causes serious 
consequences for the targeted firm. Firms (and other respondents) therefore are empowered to 
appeal to the courts against an agency’s decision. This judicial appeal constitutes the basic 
safeguard for rights of defense and procedural fairness against abuse of administrative powers by 
competition agencies. 
Nevertheless, discussions at the OECD Competition Committee2 and, most recently, at 
the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Antitrust Spring Meeting indicate that the provision of 
judicial appeals does not constitute an adequate safeguard. Procedural fairness needs to be 
secured within the decision-making process of the competition agencies. 
Setting up a hearing system within a competition agency is deemed necessary because 
courts usually find it difficult to negate an agency’s decision. This is caused by the comparative 
disadvantage between courts and agencies with regard to specialized knowledge of competition 
law and economics. Another often cited reason for the ineffectiveness of appeals to the courts is 
that courts take a long time to reach a decision; during court proceedings, an agency’s orders 
remain in effect. 
However, a hearing system presents problems—increasing the administrative and 
personnel costs of the agency, at the same time slowing down issuance of decisions. Competition 
agencies therefore need to strike the right balance between procedural fairness and efficient 
enforcement. 
Administrative hearings, as now practiced by the U.S. FTC and the EU’s DG 
Competition, represent two different models for other countries’ competition agencies to 
emulate. In this context, the Japanese experience regarding transformation of its administrative-
hearing may help reveal the relative pros and cons of the U.S. FTC and the EU models. 
I I .  THE NEED TO FOCUS EXAMINATION ON THE ADMINISTRATION MODEL OF 
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 
World-wide spread of competition laws necessitates examining procedural fairness 
practices with a globalized perspective, going beyond a selected number of highly developed 
competition law regimes, prominently those of the United States and the European Union. 
                                                      
1 Professor, Faculty of Law, Kansai University, Osaka, Japan <takigawa@kansai-u.ac.jp>. 
2 See OECD Competition Committee, Procedural Fairness and Transparency: Key Points (2012), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/50235955.pdf (accessed May 24, 2014). 
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Practically all large-scale price-fixing cases these days are global, incorporating non-western 
industrialized countries: Japan, South Korea, and China, in particular. Both Japan and Korea 
have recently greatly increased amounts of fines against competition law violations. 
From a globalized perspective, procedural justice needs to be examined focusing on the 
administration model (in contrast with the prosecution model) of competition law enforcement. 
Only a small number of countries with common-law traditions (including the U.S. Department 
of Justice, but not the U.S. Federal Trade Commission) have adopted the prosecution model, in 
which competition agencies must bring cases to courts. By contrast, in the administration model 
(practiced in a dominant majority of countries), competition agencies themselves decide cases 
and then impose fines on the targeted firms. The firms, in turn, have the right to bring the 
agencies’ decisions to courts. 
True, the prosecution model has a clear advantage in securing procedural justice because 
the model guarantees separation of prosecution from adjudication. But countries now adopting 
the administration model would find it infeasible to transform their enforcement system to a 
prosecution model. First, it is too radical a departure from the law enforcement system of 
countries with the civil (Continental) law traditions. 
Second, more importantly, the prosecution model would, in those countries, cause 
considerable delays in law enforcement, leading to less than optimal enforcement. This is 
because, in the prosecution model, firms may not be imposed fines until the courts reach 
decisions, which may take years in countries where the courts’ system is not so well developed as 
in the United States. By contrast, in the administration model, only a minority of firms resort to 
appealing to courts, and, during court proceedings, an agency’s orders remain in effect. 
I I I .  THE REASONS BEHIND THE JFTC’S SWITCH FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE-
LAW-JUDGES SYSTEM TO THE HEARING-OFFICERS SYSTEM 
Within their respective administration models, the U.S. FTC’s administrative-law-judges 
system and the EU’s hearing-officers system both provide hearings conducted prior to the 
agencies’ final decisions. Nevertheless, important differences exist between the two. First, EU 
hearing-officers only deal with procedural justice; they do not judge the substance of the law’s 
application.3 Second, hearing-officers are lacking in judge-like power to preside over hearings; 
they do not possess powers either to summon third-party witnesses or to punish false statements. 
The U.S. FTC’s administrative-law-judges and Commissioners can do both. 
In spite of the comparative advantage of the administrative-law-judge system in securing 
equity between accusers and defendants, only a minority of competition agencies have adopted 
the system. And the Japan Fair Trade Commission (“JFTC”), at the end of 2013, abolished its 
administrative-law-judges system and is now in the process of adopting a hearing-officers system 
akin to the EU system.  
Examination of the reasons for the JFTC’s forsaking the administrative-law-judge system 
reveals both pros and cons of the system. The JFTC’s administrative-law-judges system took the 
                                                      
3 Id. at 53 (“Although they [hearing officers] do not adjudicate on substance, they report to the Commissioner 
on whether the rights of defence have been fully respected and provide a full report on the Oral Hearing.”) 
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form of “Hearing-Examiners,” who were not administrative-law-judges as practiced in the U.S. 
legal system. Nevertheless, the Hearing-Examiners were modeled after the U.S. FTC, with the 
same functions as U.S. administrative-law-judges; the Examiners were independent from the 
JFTC (the Commissioners as well as the Secretariat) and acted as judges. 
Hearing-Examiners conducted JFTC’s complaints through court-like adversarial 
proceedings. The JFTC Hearing-Examiners system was qualitatively different from the European 
Commission’s hearing-officers. EC hearing-officers review procedural fairness only, while JFTC 
Hearing-Examiners not only reviewed procedural fairness but also checked facts and applications 
of the law in JFTC complaints. In other words, Hearing-Examiners, in contrast to hearing-
officers, functioned as judges. 
The JFTC Hearing-Examiners system lasted to the end of 2013. But the system had 
already ceased its essential function in 2005, when hearings ceased to be conducted prior to JFTC 
decisions. After 2005, Hearing-Examiners functioned as the first tribunal when the respondent 
firms appealed the JFTC’s decisions. Then, the business circle’s (represented by the powerful 
Japan Economic Federation’s) criticism that these hearings only delayed respondent firms’ 
appeals to courts became convincing.    
The reason for the transformation (in 2005) of the JFTC Hearing-Examiners system lay in 
its inefficiency. The system took a considerably long time (years in some cases), thus hampering 
the efficient resolution of a case. In order to rectify this deficiency, the JFTC had routinely 
resorted to a “Recommendation” procedure, whereby the JFTC “recommended” to a respondent 
firm to accept a JFTC complaint. When the firm accepted the Recommendation, the 
Recommendation (which represent the JFTC complaint) became the JFTC’s decision, without 
going through a hearing with Hearing-Examiners. The firm accepting the Recommendation was 
obligated to adhere to the remedy order incorporated in the JFTC complaint, although 
acceptance of the Recommendation did not constitute admittance of illegal conduct by the firm. 
Nevertheless, the firm accepting the Recommendation could not escape a fine (for categories of 
illegal conduct to which fines apply). Recommendation decisions therefore may not have been 
interpreted as settlements. 
A large majority of JFTC decisions originated from Recommendations. Rarely did firms 
refuse Recommendations. The efficiency of the JFTC’s case handling had thus been secured. 
However, this situation started to change in 1976 when fines against price-related cartels were 
introduced. Since then, fine amounts have been repeatedly increased through amendments to the 
Japanese competition law (Antimonopoly Act (“AMA)). Also, the scope of AMA violations 
covered by fines has broadened. These changes incentivized firms not to accept JFTC 
Recommendations. As a result, firms that refused to accept Recommendations constantly 
increased in number, leading to an increased number of hearings being conducted by Hearing-
Examiners. Firms adopted such a procedure with the aim of delaying the payment of fines, 
because fines could not be levied until the JFTC had issued a decision through the hearing 
process. 
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IV. THE NEED TO INSTITUTE INDEPENDENT HEARING-OFFICERS WITHIN THE 
COMPETITION AGENCY 
The transformation in 2005 (followed by the termination in 2013) of the Hearing-
Examiners system changed the JFTC decision procedure from a hearing system modeled after the 
U.S. FTC to a system akin to the Continental administration system—the EU competition law 
decision procedure. The JFTC is now pressed to establish within the JFTC a system akin to 
hearing-officers at the European Commission, because the repeal of the JFTC Hearing-
Examiners necessitates an alternative mechanism for securing procedural justice within JFTC 
decision-making. 
The amended AMA provisions on JFTC procedures regarding hearing-officers  
(provisionally named “Presiding officer of procedure for hearing”)4 show that the hearing-officer 
will be equipped with considerably weaker power than the EC’s hearing-officers. Most 
importantly, no measures to secure independence of the hearing-officers are instituted. 
Concomitantly, the hearing-officer is attached to the Secretariat (not to the Commissioners). 
EU experiences5 reveal that the hearing-officer needs to be equipped with independent 
power in order to amply check procedural fairness regarding the competition agency’s issuance 
of complaints. The JFTC is advised to emulate the European Commission in guaranteeing 
independence of its hearing-officers. 
V. THE NEED TO PROTECT DEFENSE RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENT FIRMS 
The hearing-officers system is superior to the administrative-law-judges system in its 
efficiency, but is inferior regarding protection of the defense rights of the accused firms. This 
inferiority needs to be compensated by giving the accused firms ample power to defend in court. 
The accused firms, then, need to be guaranteed equal-footing vis-à-vis the accuser (the 
competition agency) regarding access to the facts used for the accusation. 
The amended AMA provisions regarding JFTC procedures do not entitle the respondent 
firms sufficient access to the JFTC files.6 First, JFTC documents to which a respondent firm is 
entitled to get access are limited to those documents that the JFTC used to establish illegality of 
the respondent firm; documents that may negate the illegality are excluded. Second, a respondent 
firm is entitled to copy only the documents submitted by itself or its employees. 
These rights are conspicuously inferior to the rights given to respondent firms by the 
European Commission; the Commission hands to the respondent firm a DVD containing all 
documents (except those deemed confidential) that the DG Competition compiled in 
establishing a statement of objections. The JFTC needs to provide to a respondent, in a 
                                                      
4 See JFTC, Outline of the Bill to Amend the Antimonopoly Act, at §2-(1) (December 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2013/Dec/individual131209.files/Attachment01.pdf (accessed May 21, 
2014). 
5 See, e.g., Michael Albers & Jérémie Jourdan, The Role of Hearing Officers in EU Competition Proceedings: A 
Historical and Practical Perspective 2(3) J.E.C.L. & PRACT. 185 (2011), available at 
http://jeclap.oxfordjournals.org/content/earle/2011/05/15/jeclap.lpr023.full.pdf+html (accessed May 21, 2014). 
6 See JFTC, supra note 4, at §2-(2). 
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convenient DVD format, all evidence (subject to legitimate confidentiality concerns) used by the 
JFTC in establishing its complaint. 
VI. THE NEED TO SET UP SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURES IN COMPETITION LAW 
ENFORCEMENT: SETTLEMENTS OR CONSENT DECREES 
As hearings tend to take a long time, competition agencies need to make use of simplified 
procedures in cases in which firms agree to forgo the right to a hearing. Firms have in the past 
agreed to forgo a hearing in exchange for escaping fines, while accepting remedy orders. 
Nevertheless, competition agencies should not forgo the imposition of fines for serious 
violations—mostly, hard-core cartel conduct. For other less serious violations, competition 
agencies may forgo imposing fines in order to swiftly get rid of anticompetitive practices.7 
Settlements (or similar procedures) have the merit of swiftly resolving cases with lesser 
resources expended by competition agencies. Settlements, however, are achieved at the expense 
of not determining the illegality of the allegedly anticompetitive practices and, consequently, 
fines are not imposed on firms. Settlements, therefore, are inappropriate for serious violations 
that deserve the imposition of fines. Nor are settlements appropriate for important cases that, for 
the sake of establishing precedents, require detailed determinations on whether the practices 
under consideration constitute infringement of the law. 
The establishment of limiting principles is therefore required to constrain competition 
agencies in their use of settlements. In counterbalancing this consideration, rules that are too 
constraining would excessively deter use of settlements, at the expense of administrative 
efficiencies. 
The JFTC currently does not allow for any simplified enforcement procedure in its 
handling of competition law cases. Prior to the 2005 AMA amendment, the JFTC had two 
simplified procedures, Recommendations and consent decisions, both of which were repealed by 
the 2005 AMA amendment. 
The JFTC therefore needs to set up a new simplified procedure, most plausibly by 
reviving the consent decisions. A key obstacle, however, prevents the JFTC from instituting a 
settlements procedure. This is the mandatory nature of fines with AMA violations.8 This lack of 
discretion by the JFTC, regarding not only the amount of the fine but also whether or not to 
impose a fine at all, needs to be rectified before the JFTC puts in place a settlement procedure. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Globalization of competition law enforcement necessitates examining procedural fairness 
with a globalized perspective. Procedural fairness, then, needs to be designed based on the 
administration model, which is adopted by a dominant majority of competition agencies. 
                                                      
7 Daniel Crane names such solutions as “administrative solutions,” which have the advantage of being swifter 
and less cumbersome than “the adjudicatory system, ” see D.A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, at 107 (2011). 
8 Antimonopoly Act, Article 7-2 (as well as other similar articles) stipulate that the JFTC is obligated to impose 
fines on categories of AMA violations stipulated in the Articles. The discretion of the amount of a fine is also 
removed from the JFTC; the Antimonopoly Act, Article 7-2 (as well as other similar Articles) stipulate the concrete 
amount (on a percentage basis) of the fine for each violation.  
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The experiences of the JFTC reveals the impracticality of instituting administrative-law-
judges (or their equivalents) for competition agencies that are equipped with powers to impose 
substantial fines (the U.S. FTC is not empowered to impose fines for antitrust offenses). This is 
because a firm that is subject to a decision that imposes a fine of a considerable amount naturally 
demands a hearing rather than simply accepting a simplified procedure. Since a court-like 
proceeding by law judges (or their equivalents) takes considerable time before its conclusion, 
routine use of court-like proceedings causes delay in the resolution of a case. 
Given that appeals against competition agencies’ decisions to courts are secured, the 
hearing system within a competition agency needs not one-handedly cater to procedural fairness 
(i.e. protection of a firm’s right of defense). As an example, the hearing-officers system 
implemented at the European Commission may be regarded as sufficient for balancing 
procedural fairness with administrative efficiency. 
The best design of a hearing-officers system needs to be contemplated for each individual 
country, bearing in mind the debate over European Commission’s hearing-officers. The EU 
experiences show the critical importance of securing two points: first, independence of hearing-
officers; second, availability (to the respondent firms) of all documents (subject to legitimate 
confidentiality concerns) used by the competition agency in establishing its complaint. The JFTC 
hearing system, as currently envisaged, is deficient in both points. 
Following the adoption of an administrative hearing system, competition agencies need 
to establish simplified enforcement procedures for speeding up the resolution of cases. The most 
straightforward way to achieve this is with a settlement between a competition agency and a 
respondent firm, whereby the firm will undertake the remedy order in exchange for escaping a 
fine. Hard-core cartels should be excluded from settlements. Competition agencies also need to 
publish guidelines delineating instances where settlements may be utilized. 
